Surge of Optimism
March 24, 2008
A recent poll of Iraqis suggests a more favorable view of Americans, and more importantly, of the structures of democracy.
Iraqis
regard their safety, well-being, and prospects as substantially
improved compared to last summer (when the surge was in progress), and
last spring (when it was just beginning), according to a newly released
poll of 2,228 Iraqis conducted by D3 Systems and KA Research, Ltd. on behalf of a consortium of new organizations, including ABC News and the BBC News.
Americans
read Iraqi polls in terms of how much “they” like “us.” And in this
context, it is pleasing to note that we are uniformly more liked, or
less hated, by Iraqis of all regions and sects, according to the
consortium’s post-surge survey. But the purpose of American polity in
Iraq is not to poll the “Arab street,” but to structure that street so
that its opinion matters. A more instructive approach, therefore,
focuses on how Iraqis regard the structures of their new democracy.
Taken
February 12-20, 2008, this was the first major post-surge survey of
Iraqis. Its scope and methodology are comparable to polls that the
ABC/BBC consortium commissioned in March and August of 2007.
Compared
to last summer, the percentage of Iraqis who regard their own security
as good has risen 19 points, from 43 percent to 62 percent. The
percentage of persons who describe their own life as “going well” has
risen 16 points, from 39 percent to 55 percent. Sixty-five percent of
Iraqis now describe the availability of household necessities as good,
compared to 39 percent last summer.
In
August 2007, Iraqis expecting things to get worse over the next year
outnumbered those expecting things to get better by a margin of 39
percent to 29 percent. Since then, civilian casualties have fallen by
60 percent. In the post-surge survey, the optimists out-polled the
pessimists, 45 percent to 19 percent.
The optimism reported in
the survey is particularly impressive given its methodology. The
ABC/BBC consortium sample contains 30 percent Sunni Arabs. This
“sample” stands in marked contrast to population estimates by the
Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress and the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency. The latter estimates that Sunni Arabs
comprise 12 percent to 22 percent of Iraq’s population.
The
decision to exclude religion and ethnic weighting to a sample of Iraqis
that is 30 percent Sunni Arab has put the ABC/BBC survey series at odds
with other major Iraq pollsters, notably Oxford Research Group and
Opinion Research Business. The decision seems particularly odd, given
the fulsome coverage afforded the Sunni refugee crisis by both ABC and
BBC — the flight of several million Sunni Arabs to Jordan, Syria, and
other nations following the overthrow of Saddam.
The
result has been a series of ABC/BBC polls substantially more
pessimistic than others of equal scope. Sunni Arab tribes controlled
most things under the Baathists; Sunni Arabs had the most to lose when
the regime was overthrown. They have suffered from the invasion itself,
from the inevitable Shiite/Kurd ascendancy, and from the brutal
“anti-collaboration” machinations of al-Qaeda. Their polled opinions
reflect this experience.
An
example of the influence of the consortium’s liberal estimate of Sunni
Arab population is as follows. The ABC/BBC poll reported last spring
that by a 51 percent to 49 percent margin, Iraqis considered attacks on
coalition troops “acceptable.” This finding was derived from three
components: Sunnis, who “accepted” such attacks by 93 percent to 6
percent; Shiites, who rejected such attacks 65 percent to 35 percent;
and Kurds, who opposed anti-coalition violence 93 percent to 7 percent.
Only the double-weight of Sunnis in the sample allowed news
organizations to report (as many did) that most Iraqis approved
anti-coalition violence.
In
the current survey, Iraqis overall oppose such attacks 57 percent to 42
percent. The percentage of Sunnis who find anti-coalition violence
unacceptable has increased from 6 percent to 37 percent. But once
again, the double weight given to the 62 percent of Sunnis who continue
to approve of anti-coalition violence — at least in the abstract —
attenuates the reported improvement in relations between Iraqis and the
coalition.
Do Iraqis love us? No.
The Multi-National Force (MNF) is an army of occupation, and 99 percent
of Iraqis polled want it to leave. They just don’t want it to leave
anytime soon.
Fifty-nine
percent of those polled want coalition troops to stay until security is
restored, the government is stable, and/or the Iraqi security forces
are stronger, while another 4 percent wanted Coalition troops to stay
indefinitely. Support for a continued MNF presence increased among both
Shiites and Sunnis.
There are some specific reasons why Iraqis, who do not love us, want us to hang around:
66 percent want our security assistance “in terms of Turkey”;
68 percent want our security assistance “in terms of Iran”;
73 percent want our help in reconstruction;
76 percent want our help in training and equipping the Iraqi army; and
80 percent want us “participating in security operations against al-Qaeda or foreign Jihadis in Iraq.”
The
important results of this poll relate not to how Iraqis regard us, but
to how they regard the institutions we have mentored, and the
reconciliation we are fostering. Here are some of the consortium’s
post-surge findings:
Attitude toward a “Unified Iraq, with one central government in Baghdad”: 66 percent positive, up 8 percent since last spring;
Confidence in Iraqi national army: 65 percent, up 4 percent since last spring;
Confidence in Iraqi police: 67 percent, up 3 percent since last spring;
Confidence in local militia groups: 22 percent, down 14 percent since last spring;
Confidence in the anti-al-Qaeda “Awakening Groups” among Sunni Arabs: 73 percent;
Confidence in the anti-al-Qaeda “Awakening Groups” among Shi’ite Arabs: 60 percent;
Overall
support for allowing former mid- and low-level Baathists to take
government jobs: 69 percent, up from 56 percent last spring;
Shiite
support for allowing former mid- and low-level Baathists to take
government jobs: 63 percent, up from 35 percent last spring;
Support for the right of previous residents to re-occupy homes expropriated during the insurgency: 88 percent;
Opposition to the separation of Iraqis along religious or ethnic lines: 92 percent.
In short, cohesion is in, jihad is out; the new institutions are gaining popular support.
The
Western fascination with the vagaries of the Arab street has been
misplaced due to the totalitarian nature of most Middle Eastern
societies. The Coalition’s challenge is to create power structures in
which the “Arab street” finally matters. This implies the destruction
of the masks through which Arab opinion has been filtered in the 20th
century: Marxism, pan-Arab nationalism, and jihadism.
The end game is not for “us” to help “them,” but for them to effectively help themselves.
— Richard Nadler is president of the Americas Majority Foundation.
Why we do what we do: An essay from Iraq
March 20, 2008
This being my third trip over here, I have been able to see Iraq go
from a terrible place to live, to a somewhat tolerable place, to what it
is now, a country with a future.
My first trip over here basically had a single mission, to rid the
country of insurgents and stop Saddam Hussein’s reign of terror. My
Brigade, Battalion, Company and Section did our part and in the end,
before we left, Saddam Hussein was captured and most of the insurgents
were cowards hiding behind the scenes. When I left the first time, I
was proud of the job we had done to bring down the tyranny in Iraq.
During my first tour I earned a Combat Action Badge by absorbing an
Improvised Explosive Devise (IED) on the driver’s side of the vehicle I
was driving. It was 6 Dec 04, we were moving locations and I was called
to drive the Command Sergeants Major’s truck. We loaded up and left the
base in our soft shell HUMM-WV’s. Within two miles from the new base a
defining explosion rang to my left and the street disappeared in a cloud
of dirt and smoke. As rocks, shrapnel and debris hit the vehicle I, I
hit the gas. On a few occasions this is when the insurgents attacked
with small arms, I wanted to ensure we had a clear view when it
happened. I needed to get my men out of the smoke so we could defend
ourselves, so I stomped the gas and thrust us forward and yanked the
wheel to the right to pull off to the side so we could dismount and take
cover. Thankfully they were cowards and did not attack. After securing
the area we found that the IED was placed next to a manhole cover which
caved in causing the blast to dissipate.
During my second deployment to Iraq I had the honor of being on a
military transition team (MiTT). The MiTT is a team of US soldiers
chosen to train the Iraqi Army to stand up and proudly take charge of
their country. When I first arrived I saw a beat up, un-motivated, un-
equipped group of civilians… before I left, they were a proud, well
trained, well equipped fighting force. When I left, I was again proud
of the job my men and I did.
We were based out of Yusufiyah, in Southern Baghdad; a place that
was dubbed, “The Triangle of Death” due to how many WIA and KIA’s we
endured. Getting support down there was hard so we had to take care of
ourselves. When we first took over we received IDF mortar rounds five
days a week. On seven occasions they had landed close enough for me to
earn the CAB (Though we are authorized only one per operation). On all
seven occasions I was hit by fallout, thankfully no shrapnel. I walked
away from everything they threw at me; sadly not all were as lucky.
Though we saw our fellow Soldiers hit, though the danger was constant,
daily we pushed through and continued our mission. We didn’t lose
any of the 40 men on the MiTT team, though a few of them will never walk
again, some will take years to recover, some never will.
My third deployment to Iraq is with a support unit rather than an
Infantry unit as were my first two. Our mission is to support the Infantry
and their mission. I have seen this war from three different
perspectives, first from the aggressor, second as a trainer, third as a
supporter. With each deployment I have seen an improvement in this
country.
Though we have been here for only five months out of the 15 month
tour promised, we have seen our share of war. Just this past week we
were attacked twice by mortar and rockets. We received a mortar round a
few nights ago that was very close to home. One of my men and I were
walking into our building and I heard two distinct sounds, the sound of
mortar rounds being launched. Though off in the distance and muffled;
when you live through it once, you never forget what it sounds like.
Just as I said, “What the hell was that” I heard a round fly directly
over our head. The sound of the fins off balance cutting through the
air is very distinct, very frightening. If you are ever unfortunate to
hear it, you will know two things, first that it’s very close and second
that it’s probably not going to hit you (You would not hear it if it was
to hit you because before you realize what it is, it’s exploding).
Before we realized what it was, the round was impacting not 100 yards
away. All at once the air thickened, my heart quickened, and my adrenal
gland kicked into overdrive as I began to sweat all within a second.
We could tell where the round was traveling and quickly rotated
our head in that direction, we saw the splash of metal rise above the
15 foot barriers and within seconds the fire was roaring. At this
point I directed Trenton to get inside (our protocol). Within seconds
of the impact we could see Soldiers fighting the fire and looking for
injured Soldiers. Thankfully, no one was in the building that was
destroyed on impact.
I have seen just about everything that you don’t want to see when
at war. I have been blown up by an IED, hit by mortar rounds and I have
seen men, women and children blown apart, both civilians and fellow
Soldiers. I have seen my share of war and truthfully, I have learned now
how to deal with it. This is Trenton’s first trip and after this, he
will be leaving the service for bigger plans that he has. I do not want
him to deal with what I have had to deal with in the past. I do not
want him to have to go through the sleepless nights or to see the
horrible pictures that came to me for years when I closed my eyes. I
will shelter my Soldiers from the face of war the best I can, but when
it is thrown at them like it was last week, it’s hard to keep them away.
In the end, there ended up being three injuries, all non life
threatening. From what I am told, there was one Soldier with a
laceration on his leg, one suffered smoke inhalation and the third was
shot from a round cooking off (another reason to stay away from a
building when it is burning). The Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) was
three trailers (living quarters) that housed at least 12 Soldiers.
Thankfully, no one was home when the mortar round hit.
I wish I could say that’s it, but two days later we were hit again.
This time we endured three KIA’s. These Soldiers were in my Brigade so I
did not know them personally but the proximity brought this one close to
home. Many of the Soldiers on this tour are experiencing war for the
first time and they are pretty shaken up. We push on day by day
completing our mission, thinking about family and friends back home
asking ourselves why we do what we do. One word sums it up: freedom.
The freedom that we have, the freedom that we offer to those oppressed
is all the energy that I need to do what I do.
I have been asked if I think our mission here in Iraq is worth
while or if I think we should be here in Iraq. From my experience, I
believe in what we are doing in Iraq and I believe in my mission. I
believe in helping those that can not help themselves thus my career
choice. The carnage around a soldier is a part of the life that we
live, a chosen path. Some can handle it; some can’t, in the end we all
do our best to do what we believe in.
Sergeant First Class
Communications NCOIC
An Infantry Officer
March 19, 2008
Paul Rieckhoff spent nearly a year walking patrols as an infantry officer in Baghdad. He saw soldiers dying, his squad leader lost his legs, and he witnessed problems with missing supplies. But when he returned to the United States in 2004, the biggest news story was that Janet Jackson’s breast was exposed during the Super Bowl halftime show.
Read moreA Neighborhood Reborn
March 10, 2008
by Captain Pete Hegseth
Al Doura, Baghdad — As I step out of the humvee into the street, I have two facts in mind: I’ve been here before; and this time, I don’t have a weapon.
Recalling the tension of my first patrol in this neighborhood as a platoon leader, my five senses are sharp. The dusty road below greets my boots, some of the smells are eerily familiar, and the sound of idling humvees is my only comfort. My head swivels to scan the street. My hands are naked without an M-4, so I find the nearest soldier.
Soon — as a young child approaches — the wary familiarity gives way to fascination. I may be in the same geographic location, but I’m not in the same neighborhood. This is not Al Doura, at least not as I knew it. Where did all these people and shops come from? Where is all the trash, and the open sewage? Where is the fear — the deep-seated fear?
Children approach, as they usually do — but today it’s not just children. Young men walk up, initiating conversation. Women cross the street between our humvees, seemingly unaware of the GIs. The people are friendly, but not assertively so. Our presence is natural, almost routine. My inner tension clashes with the calm scene unfolding around me.
I take a few steps into the middle of an intersection with a clear view in all directions. Along the main thoroughfare, my immediate surroundings are replicated: block after block of shops and bustling residents. The side streets that I remember as sewage-clogged gutters are clean and teeming with construction and activity.
This is not Al Doura. The Al Doura I knew was the heart of sectarian violence, with daily body counts in the dozens. As I keep walking, I pass a busy car wash, and then a fitness center where young men pump iron and tear-outs of Muscle Fitness adorn the walls. We pass two new playgrounds, where boys clamber up and down slides and beautiful little girls play with dolls. A cart vendor offers me a bag of freshly popped popcorn — but I decline and have some falafel instead.
Increasingly relaxed and curious, I duck into side streets. One leads me to a buzzing recreation center, where soldiers are challenged to a game of pool. In the next room, teenage boys fight it out in the computer game “Medal of Honor” (which my little brother plays constantly). The World War II battle simulator heats up as we enter: the “German” I’m watching turns a virtual corner and lobs a grenade at an “American.” We all burst out laughing. That’s as much hostility as my patrol would face this day.
The entire time, we have only nominal security. It was disconcerting at first — I would never have come here unarmed two years ago — but the commander I’m walking with eases my concerns: the people are our security. The neighborhood residents trust the Americans, as well as the “Sons of Iraq” (or CLCs, as the Army calls them: Concerned Local Citizens) — local residents who provide security for the neighborhood. In a place where al-Qaeda dominated just eight months ago, today they couldn’t buy a bag of popcorn.
The unit’s commander — Lieutenant Colonel James Crider — clarifies the new situation in Doura, “We made a deliberate attempt to engage the people and soon enough, when they realized we weren’t going anywhere, that’s when they started talking to us.”
Beginning in June, while bullets were still flying, Crider’s squadron held sit-down meetings with every family in Doura, walking house-to-house over the course of several months to forge personal relationships. This approach — combined with a 24/7 presence in the neighborhoods — eventually crippled al-Qaeda. LTC Crider notes, “Al-Qaeda had no idea who was ratting them out, because we went into every house.” The relationships they fostered from these meetings provided intelligence that allowed the unit to detain al-Qaeda members who were thriving on American ignorance and hiding in plain sight. One of Crider’s lieutenants adds, “It was a battle of intel — and we won.”
These gains, however, were costly. In their first 30 days in Doura, the unit was attacked over 50 times. On the very streets we’re walking today, LTC Crider has lost nine good men, with dozens more injured. But the unit persisted — honoring the sacrifices of their brethren — and has not been attacked in their sector since September 27. As compelling testimony to the unit’s dedication to the task, LTC Crider’s squadron had the highest reenlistment rate in all of Baghdad in 2007, exceeding their goal by over 500 percent.
As we walk, we see scars of the neighborhood’s violent recent past — bombed-out homes pepper the area and bullet-sprayed walls are everywhere. Some power wires dangle out of place. All is not perfect — but signs of life keep finding us. As we reach the end of the block, three young males approach, all looking for work and eager to join the “Sons of Iraq.” This is typical, Crider informs me, and the unit jots down their names.
LTC Crider and his soldiers understand that the security gains, though real, are still tenuous — if alternatives to insurgency are not soon in place. The unit has given out hundreds of business micro-loans, many of which were used for street-front stores. They fund only local contractors, who hire local workers to pick up trash, fix sewage pipes, and provide electricity. The people of Doura themselves are rebuilding Doura — with the U.S. Army’s help.
Before going to lunch with a local leader, I stop and talk with Omar, the owner of a small grocery. He’s clean-shaven, well dressed, and roughly my age. He moved to Doura about two years ago (when my unit was here), after being displaced from his town by the Mahdi Army.
I ask him why hadn’t he joined al-Qaeda either to expel Americans or retaliate against the Shia. He replied, “Because al-Qaeda kills civilians, including my aunt and three cousins.” His uncle was a local contractor — an offense to al-Qaeda, punishable by the killing of his wife and daughters. Omar speaks candidly of the U.S. presence here: “Americans have made many mistakes, but now they are fixing them. . . . If Americans leave now, it will be a disaster.”
The most telling aspect of our conversation is where it takes place — on the street, out in the open, and among Omar’s fellow residents. He is not afraid, and vows to fight al-Qaeda if they ever return. I ask him why, of all places, he decided to move to Doura at the height of the violence here. “Because they are good people,” he answers.
It was then that I realized I had never really been to this place — I just thought I had. This is the real Al Doura, a neighborhood and a people reborn — thanks to the bravery and sacrifice of LTC Crider and his men. Today, I saw Al Doura for the first time.
— Captain Pete Hegseth, who served in Iraq with the 101st Airborne Division from 2005 to 2006, is executive director of Vets for Freedom. He’s back in Iraq for the next week to cover the surge for NRO.
In the Slums of Fallujah
March 4, 2008
by Michael J. Totten, independent journalist in Iraq FALLUJAH, IRAQ – Captain Steve Eastin threw open the door to the Iraqi Police captain’s office and cancelled a joint American-Iraqi officer’s meeting before it could even begin. “Someone just shot at my Marines,” he said. “We can’t do this right now.”
I followed him into the hall.
“What happened?” I said.
“Someone just shot at my guys at the flour mill,” he said. “A bullet struck a wall four feet over a Marine’s head. We have to go in there and extract them.”
“They don’t extract themselves?” I said.
“They’re on foot,” he said, “and we’re going in vehicles. They don’t extract themselves on foot.”
And I was getting comfortable and even bored in post-insurgent Fallujah. Complacency kills, and Fallujah isn’t completely free of insurgents just yet.
“Can I go with the extraction team?” I said. “They’ve already left in Humvees,” he said.
But he did send a patrol to the flour mill less an hour later, and I went with them.
Captain Eastin is the commanding officer of Lima Company, and they operate in the slums of southern Fallujah. The houses down there are smaller than they are in the rest of the city, and much more decrepit. Southern Fallujah isn’t nearly as rough as a Latin American, Indian, or Egyptian shantytown, but its residents live a hardscrabble life and largely depend on charity for survival. There isn’t much of an economy. Unemployment is well over 50 percent. Many residents worked in the industrial district, but only a few factories have re-opened so far. Business owners are waiting for government compensation which was supposed to have been delivered from Baghdad months ago.
During periods of heavy fighting there were more insurgents in this part of the city than in the north, but they fought more for money than ideology. They needed the survival cash Al Qaeda paid them.
Fallujah Adjusts to Peace
February 25, 2008
From Barbara Starr, CNN FALLUJA, Iraq (CNN) — Smoke rose from Falluja three short years ago. Once a stronghold for al Qaeda in Iraq, the city saw brutal urban combat after insurgents ambushed, killed and mutilated four U.S. security contractors, leaving their charred bodies dangling from a bridge over the Euphrates River in spring 2004. U.S. and Iraqi forces attacked insurgents in Falluja and embarked on one of the largest offensives of the Iraq war in November of that year. The battles killed about 1,200 militants, eight Iraqi soldiers and 51 U.S. troops, mostly Marines, according to the Pentagon. About 95 percent of Falluja’s population was displaced. After the city 30 miles west of Baghdad was pacified, the United States committed more than $200 million to reconstruction projects in Falluja, and a lot has changed in the past three years. Now, small cafes and grocery stores line streets once dusty and abandoned. Customers finger vibrant clothes, fabric and jewelry in shops near beige concrete walls that still bear the scars of war.
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